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INTRODUCTION
The experimental use doctrine' is a common law rule in patent law
that until a few years ago excused accused infringers who made and used
patented products or processes on the basis of an experimental, educa-
tional, or nonprofit purpose when there was de minimis economic injury
to the patent owner and de minimis economic gain to the infringer.
While the application of the experimental purpose doctrine was always
* J.D., expected in 2005, the University of Michigan Law School; Ph.D. in Biochem-
istry, Peking Union Medical College; B.S. in Biophysics, Nankai University. The author
would like to thank Joel Neckers and Darcie Tilly for their valuable comments.
1. This Note uses "experimental purpose doctrine", as opposed to terms such as "ex-
perimental use defense" and "experimental use exception", to avoid unnecessary confusion
with the rule that allows inventors to test their inventions under certain conditions without
triggering the "public use bar" or the "on sale bar" under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). See 2
Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 6.02 (2003).
2. See 5 Chisum, supra note 1, § 16.03[1] (2004).
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narrow, two recent Federal Circuit decisions indicate that there is not
much left under its aegis.' In Madey v. Duke University, the Federal Cir-
cuit strictly limited the application of the experimental purpose doctrine
to those endeavors which are "solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curi-
osity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.'"4 A year later, in Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA the Federal Circuit held that the safe
harbor provision in the Hatch-Waxman Acte would not shield defendants
who infringe patents while identifying new drug candidates.6 Although
these two decisions strengthened the protection of patents, they also
alarmed some commentators because of their potential negative impact
on academic research, particularly biomedical research!
This Note presents both empirical data and an economic analysis of
the interaction between universities and the biotechnology industry to
show that Madey and Integra were decided correctly, and that the con-
cerns expressed by Madey and Integra's critics are unfounded.
In Part I, this Note reviews the historical development and current
status of the experimental purpose doctrine.8 Next, Part II argues that
given that the line between academia and the biotechnology industry has
3. The federal district courts have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents. 28 U.S.C. 1338(a) (2000). In 1982, Congress created
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over most
cases involving patent issues. 28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(1) (2004). A Federal Circuit decision can be
further reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court rarely
grants certiorari in patent cases, making the Federal Circuit the court of last resort in most
instances. Therefore, U.S. patent law is predominantly shaped by the decisions of the Federal
Circuit. See generally 4 Chisum, supra note 1, § 11.06 (2004).
4. 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003). In
Madey, the Federal Circuit refused to characterize experimental use as affirmative defense. It
continued to refer it "as both an exception and a defense." Id. at 1361.
5. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (1984) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000)).
6. 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
7. See Nicholas Groombridge & Sheryl Calabro, Integra Lifesciences v. Merck-Good
for Research or Just Good for Research Tool Patent Owners? 22 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP.
462, 463 (2003); Tom Saunders, Case Comment, Renting Space on the Shoulder of Giants:
Madey and the Future of the Experimental Use Doctrine, 113 YALE L.J. 261, 262 (2003); see
also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, 299 SCIENCE 1018, 1019 (2003); Nata-
lie M. Derzko, In Search of a Compromised Solution to the Problem Arising from Patenting
Biomedical Research Tools, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347, 389 (2004).
8. The analysis and arguments presented in this Note apply to both public and private
universities (and similarly situated pubic and private non-profit research institutions). Both
public and private entities can invoke the experimental purpose doctrine. It is important to
note, however, that in patent infringement suits brought against public universities there may
be Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity issues. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Says. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that a federal statute that sub-
jected states to patent infringement suits could not be constitutionally supported). For an
argument against state immunity in patent infringement, see generally Brandon White, Com-
ment, Protecting Patent Owners from Infringement by the States: Will the Intellectual Property
Rights Restoration Act of 1999 Finally Satisfy the Court? 35 AKRON L. REV. 531 (2002).
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blurred, if not totally disappeared, patent law should not provide univer-
sities and non-profit research institutions special protection under the
experimental purpose doctrine. To support this argument, Part II surveys
the extensive involvement of universities in industry and presents an em-
pirical study of patent infringement suits between universities and
industry. Lastly, Part III presents an economic analysis of the experimen-
tal purpose doctrine based on the empirical data presented in Part II. Part
III argues that the empirical evidence suggests that universities are not in
danger of being overwhelmed by the patent litigation mounted by the
biotechnology industry.
I. THE EXPERIMENTAL PURPOSE DOCTRINE
Every patent is "a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling
the invention."9 Even though patents create a right in the patent owner to
exclude others from practicing the patented invention, this right to ex-
clude is not absolute.' ° This Part reviews one of the limitations on the
right of exclusion: the experimental purpose doctrine.
A. Origin of the Experimental Purpose Doctrine
The experimental purpose doctrine is a common law limitation on
patent owners' right of exclusion. Its history can be traced back to an
early nineteenth-century opinion written by Justice Story in Whittemore
v. Cutter" Noting that the defendant was not making the infringing de-
vice for profit, Justice Story explained, "it could never have been the
intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a ma-
chine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of
ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described ef-
fects.' 2 Later in Sawin v. Guild, Justice Story clarified the holding of
Whittemore: "the making of a patented machine to be an offence within
the purview of it, must be the making with an intent to use for profit, and
not for the mere purpose of philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the
verity and exactness of the specification."'3
In the 170 years that followed Whittemore and Sawin, the experi-
mental purpose doctrine was rarely utilized to excuse infringing
9. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
10. See 5 Chisum, supra note 1, § 16.03 (2004).
11. 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
12. Id. at 1121.
13. 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
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activities.14 However, in the few instances when it was invoked it was
stated in expansive terms, excusing the making and using of patented
products or processes for experimental, educational or nonprofit pur-
poses. For example, in Ruth v. Stearns Roger Manufacturing Co., a
district court found that the manufacturer of the infringing equipment
was not liable for contributory infringement because the purchaser of the
infringing equipment was a school that used the equipment in further-
ance of its educational purpose.
6
B. Roche, Hatch-Waxman, and the District Courts'Responses
In 1984 the Federal Circuit issued an opinion that narrowed the ex-
perimental purpose doctrine's guise significantly. In Roche Products,
Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., the Federal Circuit held that the ex-
perimental purpose doctrine did not immunize the defendant's infringing
activities since they were not for "amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or
for strictly philosophical inquiry."'
7
Roche owned the patent covering the chemical compound fluraze-
pam hydrochloride, the active ingredient in Roche's successful
prescription sleeping pill "Dalmane." Bolar wanted to market a generic
version of Roche's sleeping pill once Roche's patent expired in 1984.
However, before it could market such generic it needed approval from
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) which could take two years to
obtain. Not content to wait until the patent expired to obtain the neces-
sary data for FDA approval, Bolar acquired some flurazepam
hydrochloride from a foreign manufacturer and started testing it in mid-
1983.
Roche consequently sued Bolar for patent infringement. The district
court found no infringement. 8 The Federal Circuit disagreed. 9 The Fed-
eral Circuit held that the experimental purpose doctrine did not cover
"limited use of a patented drug for testing and investigationstrictly re-
14. See 5 Chisum, supra note 1, § 16.03 (2004).
15. Id.; see Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1018.
16. 13 F Supp. 697, 713 (D. Colo. 1935); see also Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble
Co., 18 F Supp. 305 (N.D. W. Va. 1937) (holding that the defendant was not liable for patent
infringement when the defendant, in the course of researching and developing a marble-
making machine, experimented with a device covered by the plaintiffs patent); Chesterfield v.
United States, 159 F. Supp. 371, 375 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (holding that there was no infringement
because "the evidence shows that a portion of the ... alloy procured by the defendant was used
only for testing and for experimental purposes, and there is no evidence that the remainder
was used other than experimentally"); see generally 5 Chisum, supra note 1, § 16.03 (2004).
17. 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984).
18. Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 572 F. Supp. 255, 258 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
19. 733 F2d at 860.
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lated to FDA drug approval requirements during the last 6 months of the
term of the patent."' The court reasoned that Bolar may have intended to
perform "experiments," but the unlicensed experiments it conducted with
a view to the adaptation of the patented invention to Bolar's business
was a violation of the rights of the patentee to exclude others from using
his patented invention. The court stated, "it is a misnomer to call [Bo-
lar's] intended use de minimis. It is no trifle in its economic effect on the
parties even if the quantity used is small. It is no dilettante affair such as
Justice Story envisioned."21 In conclusion, the Federal Circuit refused to
construe the experimental purpose doctrine so as to immunize Bolar's
experiments since such construction would "allow a violation of the pat-
ent laws in the guise of 'scientific inquiry,' when that inquiry has
definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes. 22
The generic drug industry actively lobbied Congress to overrule
Roche.23 In response Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (more commonly known as the
Hatch-Waxman Act).24 Hatch-Waxman provides:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell,
or sell within the United States or import into the United States a
patented invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary
biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is
primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant
RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site
specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses rea-
sonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufac-
ture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.25
The purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to bring low cost generic
drugs to the market quickly by exempting certain research uses from
patent infringement liability. Roche was overruled by 35 U.S.C. §
271(e)(1) which created a safe harbor for generic drug makers if their
infringing activities were intended to prepare information for FDA
20. Id. at 861.
21. Id. at 863.
22. Id.
23. See generally Janice M. Mueller, "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental
Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 25
(2001).
24. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
(2000)).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
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approval. The language of § 271(e)(1), however, is broadly written and
does not unambiguously delineate the statute's scope.
Consequently, in the years following the enactment of Hatch-
Waxman, federal district courts were able to get around the Federal Cir-
cuit's narrowing of the experimental purpose doctrine in Roche by
broadly interpreting the safe harbor provisions of § 271(e)(1). For exam-
ple, in 1998 a district court in Massachusetts ruled that § 271(e)(1)
exempted a pharmaceutical company's activities that allegedly infringed
Amgen's patents covering genetically engineered erythropoietin, since
the activities were aimed at acquiring FDA approval for a competing
product.26 A district court in New York issued a similar ruling in Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.27 Bristol-Myers Squibb
used the intermediates patented by Rh6ne-Poulenc Rorer to synthesize
the cancer drug Taxol in order to develop a closely related compound to
compete with Taxol. The court held that even though the allegedly in-
fringing activities did not directly generate data for FDA approval, they
were exempt under § 271(e)( 1).2' Likewise, in Nexell Therapeutics, Inc.
v. AmCell Corp., a district court in Delaware extended the safe harbor to
cover defendant AmCell's pre-clinical activities.29
While the district courts were utilizing § 271(e)(1) to circumvent
Roche, the Federal Circuit sat quietly. For fifteen years the court was
silent on the experimental purpose doctrine. During this time period
Roche was highly criticized. Commentators argued that the court's nar-
row interpretation of the experimental purpose doctrine should be
broadened.30
Then in 2000, in the case Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.,
the Federal Circuit reiterated its holding from Roche.3 It stated that the
experimental purpose doctrine only covers those experiments that are
"for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry" and it admonished district courts to "not construe the experi-
mental use rule so broadly so as to allow a violation of the patent laws in
the guise of scientific inquiry, when that inquiry has definite, cognizable,
and not insubstantial commercial purpose."32
26. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998).
27. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833, 2001
WL 1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2001).
28. The Bristol-Myers Squibb case eventually reached the Federal Circuit, but was
resolved on a different ground: the patent in suit was not enforceable because of inequitable
conduct during prosecution. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326
F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
29. 199 F. Supp. 2d. 197 (D. Del. 2002).
30. See e.g., Mueller, supra note 23.
31. 216 E3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
32. Id. at 1349.
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Two years later, in Madey v. Duke University, the Federal Circuit
narrowed the application of the experimental purpose doctrine even fur-
ther.33
C. Madey v. Duke University
In the 1980's, while a tenured research professor at Stanford Univer-
sity, John Madey invented the free electron laser ("FEL"). In 1988, Duke
University's physics department recruited him from Stanford. The fol-
lowing year, Madey moved his FEL research lab to Duke. Included in the
items moved to Duke was equipment Madey designed. The equipment
incorporated two patents he obtained during his tenure at Stanford.34
Madey served as director of the FEL lab at Duke for almost a dec-
ade. During his tenure as director of the FEL lab, the lab made many
scientific breakthroughs and obtained significant research funding. Nev-
ertheless, a dispute arose between Madey and Duke. Duke contended
that Madey managed the lab ineffectively in spite of his scientific exper-
tise. Madey maintained that Duke sought to use the lab's equipment for
research outside the allocated scope of certain government funding. He
alleged that when he objected to such use, Duke tried to remove him as
lab director. In 1997, Duke succeeded in removing Madey as director of
the lab. Consequently, Madey resigned from Duke.35
Duke, however, continued to use some of the equipment in the FEL
lab. In response Madey sued Duke for infringing the two patents incor-
porated in the equipment, in addition to a variety of other claims.36
The district court granted Duke summary judgment on the basis of
the experimental purpose doctrine. 3 After noting that there was an ex-
ception from infringement liability for unauthorized uses of patented
inventions where the uses were for research, academic, or experimental
purposes, the court ruled in favor of the university because "[Duke's]
primary purpose is to teach, research, and expand knowledge, and to not
engage in patent development for the purpose of commercial benefit"
and because Madey failed to produce sufficient evidence that Duke's
infringement had "definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial
purposes.38
The Federal Circuit reversed.39 In reversing the district court's deci-
sion, the Federal Circuit could have based its ruling on the fact that
33. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
34. Id. at 1352.
35. Id. at 1352-53.
36. Id.
37. Madey v. Duke Univ., 266 R Supp. 2d 420 (M.D. N.C. 2001).
38. Id. at 426-27.
39. 307 F3d at 1352.
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Duke's activities did not fall within the narrow boundaries of the ex-
perimental purpose doctrine as set forth in Roche and Embrex. Duke was
not tinkering with the equipment to understand Madey's inventions bet-
ter, therefore its infringing activities were not excused. The court's
holding, however, was not based upon past delineations of the doctrine.
In issuing its holding in Madey, the Federal Circuit further limited the
scope of the experimental purpose doctrine.
The Federal Circuit started its opinion in Madey by chastising the
district court for having an "an overly broad conception of the very nar-
row and strictly limited experimental use defense", exactly what it
instructed district courts not to do in Embrex.4 It then criticized Ruth v.
Steams Roger Manufacturing Co., one of the cases that the district
court's decision was based upon.4' The Federal Circuit criticized Ruth as
being inconsistent with its holdings in Embrex and Roche.42 It supported
this criticism by observing the inherently commercial characteristics of
research universities:
Our precedent clearly does not immunize use that is in any way
commercial in nature. Similarly, our precedent does not immu-
nize any conduct that is in keeping with the alleged infringer's
legitimate business, regardless of commercial implications. For
example, major research universities, such as Duke, often sanc-
tion and fund research projects with arguably no commercial
application whatsoever. However, these projects unmistakably
further the institution's legitimate business objectives, including
educating and enlightening students and faculty participating in
these projects. These projects also serve, for example, to in-
crease the status of the institution and lure lucrative research
grants, students and faculty. 
43
The court then restated what activities qualify for the experimental
purpose doctrine:
[R]egardless of whether a particular institution or entity is en-
gaged in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is
in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business and
is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for
strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the
very narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense.
40. Id. at 1361.
41. Id. at 1362 (citing Ruth v. Steams-Roger Manufacturing Company, 13 F. Supp. 697,
713 (D. Colo. 1935)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1362.
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Moreover, the profit or nonprofit status of the user is not deter-
minative."
In remanding the case to the district court, the Federal Circuit left lit-
tle hope that Duke could use the experimental purpose doctrine as a
defense. The Federal Circuit criticized the district court for attaching too
great a weight to the nonprofit, educational status of Duke, and effec-
tively suppressing the fact that Duke's acts appeared to be in accordance
with its business objectives. It instructed the district court to significantly
narrow its conception of the experimental use defense, focus not on the
non-profit status of Duke but on the business Duke was involved in, and
ascertain whether the experiments carried out in the FEL lab after
Madey's departure were solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity,
or for strictly philosophical inquiry.5
For nearly two centuries university researchers were protected from
patent infringement suits by the experimental purpose doctrine. In es-
sence, Madey announced that the exception would no longer apply.4
6
D. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA
One year after its decision in Madey, the Federal Circuit cut back the
district courts' broad interpretations of § 271(e)(1). In Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KgaA, it held that Hatch-Waxman's safe
harbor was merely "meant to reverse the effect of Roche under limited




45. Id. at 1362-63. This, nonetheless, might not be the end of the story, as Judge New-
man in her dissenting opinion in Integra argued:
[Madey] concerned the use of a patented laser device for the purpose for which it
was made, not research into understanding or improving the design or operation of
the machine. The facts of Madey v. Duke do not invoke the common law research
exemption, despite the broad statement in that opinion. I do not disagree with that
decision on its facts; I disagree only with its sweeping dictum, and its failure to dis-
tinguish between investigation into patented things, as has always been permitted,
and investigation using patented things, as has never been permitted.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d at 878, n.10 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
46. It should be noted that the Federal Circuit did not throw out the experimental pur-
pose doctrine completely: "the experimental use defense persists albeit in the very narrow
form articulated by this court in Embrex, and in Roche." Madey, 307 F.3d at 1361 (citations
omitted).
47. 331 F.3d at 867 (emphasis added).
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At issue in Integra was a research project undertaken by Dr.
Cheresh, a scientist at the Scripps Research Institute (Scripps).48 Merck
hired Dr. Cheresh to identify potential drug candidates that would halt
tumor growth by inhibiting the formation of blood vessels which provide
vital nutrients to rapidly dividing tumor cells. Dr. Cheresh's research
showed that one drug, cyclic peptide EMD 66203, displayed promise.
Consequently, Merck entered into an agreement with Scripps to fund the
necessary experiments to satisfy the biological bases and FDA require-
ments for the implementation of clinical trials with EMD 66203 or a
derivative of it. The agreement contemplated commencing clinical trials
with a drug candidate within three years. In 1997, the Scripps research
team chose EMD 121974, a derivative of EMD 66203, as the best candi-
date for clinical development.49
Integra, which owned five patents related to a short tri-peptide seg-
ment of fibronectin (the "RGD peptide"), learned of the Scripps-Merck
agreement. Believing the Scripps research was a commercial project that
infringed upon its RGD-related patents, Integra offered Merck licenses
to its patents. After Merck declined, Integra sued Merck, Scripps, and
Dr. Cheresh. Merck responded by arguing that its work with Scripps was
protected by the safe harbor provided by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). Merck
also argued that Integra's patents were invalid. °
The district court agreed with Merck on one issue; it held that one of
Integra's patents was anticipated by a 1984 NATURE article.5' However, it
refused to acknowledge that the defendants' infringing activities were
within the protection of the safe harbor afforded by § 271(e)(1).52 At
trial, the jury found Merck liable for infringing the remaining four of
Integra's patents.53 On appeal, Merck argued that the district court erred
in interpreting § 271 (e)( 1).14 The Federal Circuit disagreed."
As in Madey, the Federal Circuit could have ruled against the ac-
cused infringer based on rules set down in previous decisions. As in
Madey, however, the court adopted a different line of reasoning. It held
that Hatch-Waxman's safe harbor does not cover pre-clinical activities.
To qualify for the exemption, an otherwise infringing activity must rea-
48. Scripps is "one of the country's largest, private, non-profit research organizations".
TSRI-About TSRI, at http://www.scripps.edu/intro/intro.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2004).
49. Integra, 331 E3d at 862-63.
50. Id. at 863.
51. Id. at 863-64.
52. Id. at 863.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 864.
55. Id. at 862.
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sonably relate to the development and submission of information for
16FDA's "safety and effectiveness" approval processes.
While the court admitted that the term "reasonably" permitted some
activities that do not directly produce FDA information to qualify under
§ 271(e)(1), it noted that the context of Hatch-Waxman keys its use to
facilitating expedited approval of generics.57 Thus, the court stated, ex-
tending the safe harbor protection of § 271(e)(1) to embrace new drug
development activities would ignore § 271(e)(1)'s language and context
and would not confine the scope of § 271(e)(1) to a de minimis en-
croachment on the rights of the patentee. 8
The court reasoned that because the FDA had no interest in hunting
for drugs that might not undergo clinical testing, "the Scripps work
sponsored by Merck was not clinical testing to supply information to the
FDA, but general biomedical research to identify new pharmaceutical
compounds. 59 Consequently, the court found that the Scripps work
sponsored by Merck was beyond the scope of § 271(e)(1).
6
0
While the Integra decision did not directly address the common law
experimental purpose doctrine, its holding effectively shut down the
loophole created by the district courts' broad interpretations of the statu-
tory exception created in § 271(e)(1).
6
1
II. UNIVERSITIES AND THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY-
A REALITY CHECK
A substantial proportion of the biomedical research conducted in the
United States is conducted by universities like Duke or non-profit insti-
tutions such as the Scripps Research Institute. The combination of
Madey and Integra suggests that in the future neither the common law
experimental purpose doctrine nor the statutory experimental exception
under § 271(e)(1) will be a useful defense for universities in patent in-
fringement suits. To evaluate the potential impact of these two cases on
biomedical research, this Part surveys the involvement of universities in
the biotechnology industry and analyzes past patent infringement battles
between universities and industry.
56. Id. at 866.
57. Id. at 866-67.
58. Id. at 867.
59. Id. at 866.
60. Id.
61. It should also be noted that even though the Integra decision was not based on
common law experiment purpose doctrine, the majority reaffirmed its holding in Madey. Id. at
863-64, n.2.
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A. Entrepreneurial Universities and Professors
In 1980 Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole Act6 which afforded uni-
versities the right to patent the results of government-funded research.
Since the Act's enactment, American universities have accumulated nu-
merous patents. According to a 2000 survey conducted by the
Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM), prior to
Bayh-Dole fewer than 250 U.S. patents were issued to American univer-
sities each year.63 Since 1993, universities have annually obtained, on
average, more than 1,600 U.S. patents. 64 In addition, from 1991 to 1999
there was a 198% increase in new U.S. patent applications. 6' For fiscal
year 2002, 7,741 new U.S. patent applications were filed by 216 institu-
tions and 3,673 U.S. patents were issued to 219 institutions.
66
Since the enactment of Bayh-Dole, universities have also been able
to collect a significant amount of royalties from their patents. 6' There are
now more than 200 universities engaged in technology transfer, eight
times more than in 1980.68 In addition, from 1991 to 1999, there was a
133% increase in the number of licenses issued to U.S. universities.69
One of the best known examples of a patent that generated large
revenues for a U.S. university is the Cohen-Boyer patent.70 The Cohen-
Boyer patent was owned by Stanford University and the University of
California.71 Through non-exclusive licenses, Stanford and the University
of California were able to collect about two hundred million dollars."
62. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (1980)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000)).
63. Ass'n. Univ. Tech. Managers, Surveys-Bayh-Dole Act, available at
http:llwww.autm.net/pubs/surveylfacts.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2004)(subsequently pass-
word protected) [hereinafter Surveys-Bayh-Dole Act].
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. AUTM Licensing Survey: FY 2002, available at http://www.autm.net/indexn4.html
(last visited Nov. 29, 2004) (subsequently password protected) [hereinafter Licensing Survey:
FY 2002].
67. See.generally Francesco Fiondella, Innovation's Reward, THE SCIENTIST, Mar. 1,
2004, at 41 (Fiondella's data shows that top research universities receive millions of dollars
from licensing their patents. The institution that received the most amount of income from
licensing in 2002 was Columbia University. Columbia collected $168.1 million in 2002. This
is equal to 41.3% of its total research expenditure for 2002).
68. Surveys-Bayh-Dole Act, supra note 63.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Rebecca Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REv. 1663, 1710
(1996).
71. U.S. Patent No. 4,237,224 (issued Dec. 2, 1980). The Cohen-Boyer patent covered
one of the most wildly used techniques in biology, recombinant DNA technology.
72. See Ken Howard, News, Biotechs Sue Columbia over Fourth Axel Patent, 21 NA-
TURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 955 (2003).
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Stanford and the University of California are not the only research
universities actively engaged in licensing. An AUTM survey reported
that for 2002, the gross licensing income received by 218 institutions
was $1.267 billion and the royalties on product sales for 212 institutions
amounted to $1.005 billion73. Licensing of innovations by academic in-
stitutions in 1999 alone added about $40 billion to the U.S. economy and
supported 260,000 jobs.74
Professors, like universities, are beneficiaries of patents. Many pro-
fessors are deeply involved in the biotechnology industry, acting as
directors or scientific advisors of biotechnology companies, or founding
their own biotechnology companies. For example, many well-established
biologists, including Nobel laureates, are famous for the companies they
founded."
The involvement of universities and professors in the biotechnology
industry and the significant amount of money they have obtained in re-
turn suggests that many of their research activities are no longer
undertaken for pure scientific inquiry. Their research has commercial
implications. As the Madey court correctly recognized, universities and
professors are commercial entities.76 Therefore, if research results in pat-
ent infringement, it should not be automatically exempted under the
experimental purpose doctrine just because it occurred at a non-profit or
educational institution. Because the line between the academic research
carried out on university campuses and the "research and development"
carried out by for-profit corporations has blurred, if not totally disap-
peared, the playground should be level. Universities and biotechnology
companies should be held to the same standard.
B. Litigious Universities
Universities are sophisticated players in biomedical research. Not
only are they actively involved in patent applications and licensing, they
are also diligent about protecting their patent rights. For example, uni-
versities are very aggressive in going after biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies if they believe a company is infringing a
73. Licensing Survey: FY 2002, supra note 66.
74. Surveys-Bayh-Dole Act, supra note 63.
75. See, e.g., Carolina Braunschweig, BioVentures Triples Previous Fund, PRIVATE
EQUITY WK., Sept. 8, 2003 (reporting that Walter Gilbert, a Nobel laureate and professor at
Harvard, is the founder of six biotechnology companies); Faith Keenan, Biotech's Hope isn't
Just DNA Anymore, BUSINESS WK., Mar. 10, 2003, at 72 (reporting that Nobel laureate Phillip
A. Sharp, a professor at MIT, co-founded Alnlyam Pharmaceuticals (Cambridge, MA));
http://www.biogen.com/site/010.html (last visited April 9, 2004) (recording that Sharp, to-
gether with Gilbert, helped co-found biotech giant Biogen).
76. 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
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patent they hold. Sometimes, they are successful. For instance, when
Johns Hopkins University sued Cellpro for infringing its patent on
monoclonal antibodies, a jury awarded it $2.3 million dollars in compen-
satory damages.7 In addition, since the district court found Cellpro to
have infringed willfully, it imposed treble damages." In another exam-
ple, the University of California received a $200 million settlement in
response to a patent infringement suit it filed against Genentech. 9
Universities, however, are not always successful when they go after
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. For example, the Univer-
sity of Rochester unsuccessfully sued Pfizer and several other
pharmaceutical companies for infringement of its patent on the Cox-2
gene.80 Cox-2 is the target through which the blockbuster drugs Vioxx
and Celebrex work. The university sought ten percent of Pfizer's annual
three billion dollars in sales of Celebrex in damages.8' In another lawsuit,
the University of California unsuccessfully sued pharmaceutical giant
Eli Lilly for patent infringement. 82 The patents at issue in the Eli Lily suit
covered the recombinant plasmids and microorganisms that produce hu-
man insulin. 3 In both cases the district courts ruled that the universities'
patents were invalid for failure to comply with the statutory written de-
scription requirement.'
Sometimes, universities have been too aggressive in their tactics and
have provoked preemptive strikes from the biotechnology industry. For
example, Columbia University owned three patents that covered gene-
splicing technology. All of them were set to expire in 2000.85 Columbia
enlisted its alumni to lobby Congress to extend the patents. In addition, it
77. See John Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
78. The Federal Circuit affirmed the damages award. Id. at 1365.
79. Bernadette Tansey, Biotech Firm's Image on Trial/Genentech Enters Damages
Phases, S.F. CHRON., June 16, 2002, at G1.
80. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216 (W.D.N.Y 2003).
81. Michael J. Shuster et al., Protecting Rights to Early-stage Technology, 21 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 701, 702 (2003) (noting that if the university won, it could also sue Merck
for royalties on its $2.5 billion annual sales of Vioxx).
82. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. MDL DKT. 912, IP-92-0224-C-
D/G, 1995 WL 735547 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
83. See Linda Williams, UC Regents Sue Lilly In Dispute Over Biotech Patent For Insu-
lin, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1990, at Dl ("Lilly, one of the largest U.S. pharmaceutical companies,
controls 80% of the U.S. insulin market with two products. It markets insulin derived from
animals under the name Iletin but sells far more of the genetically engineered insulin sold
under the Humulin name. Some analysts estimate 1989 sales of Humulin at $295 million,
compared to $160 million for Iletin'")
84. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Univ.
of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
85. Howard, supra note 72, at 955.
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filed and eventually was granted, "submarine" patents.86 Biotechnology
companies, including Biogen, Genzyme, and Abbott Bioresearch Center,
however, struck back and sued Columbia, accusing it of engaging in an
illegitimate effort to create a "patent monopoly."87 Amgen and Genentech
also filed similar lawsuits."8
C. Universities Are Not Victims-An Empirical Study
Some legal commentators have expressed concern about the effect of
a narrow interpretation of the experimental purpose doctrine on research
universities.89 They worry that academic vigor will be suppressed and
that researchers will not pursue certain projects out of the fear of being
held liable for patent infringement. But few of Madey and Integra's crit-
ics have provided empirical data to back up such a claim.
In the following paragraphs this Note provides empirical data which
suggest that universities have not and are not being sued for patent in-
fringement by the biotechnology industry. Table 1 summarizes the
results of a survey of the patent cases involving universities that came
before the Federal Circuit between 1983 and September of 2004.90
86. U.S. Patent No. 6,455,275 (issued Sep. 3, 2002). A patent application may have a
long examination period due to delays by the Patent and Trademark Office and/or from con-
tinuation applications. Patents that remain "submerged" during a long ex parte examination
process and then "surface" upon the grant of the patent have been labeled "submarine" pat-
ents. A holder of a "submarine" patent may be able to demand high royalties from non-patent
holders who invested and used the technology not knowing that patent would later be granted.
See 4A Chisum, supra note 1, § 13.05(1) (2004).
87. Howard, supra note 72, at 955.
88. Id.
89. See Groombridge & Calabro, supra note 7, at 463; Saunders, supra note 7, 262; see
also Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1019; Derzko, supra note 7, at 389.
90. This survey was conducted in September 2004 using the Westlaw case law database
of the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit. The survey retrieved all the cases with at least
one university as a party by using the key word "university" to search the titles of the cases in
the database. While this approach will miss cases that involve universities and colleges that do
not have the word "university" in their names, such as Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
this survey is not intended to be a comprehensive study. Rather, this approach was intended to
generate a set of representative cases. The search fetched a total of 67 cases, spanning the
period from 1983 to September of 2004. The cases were then individually reviewed to remove
cases unrelated to patent law. If the case was pending before the Federal Circuit or was dis-
posed without opinion, the reports from lower courts, if available, were reviewed. This
generated a list of 33 patent law cases where at least one party was a university.
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF PATENT CASES WHERE A UNIVERSITY WAS A PARTY
C
0 - C E . -o 0)
iti a) 0 3 = E 0U2
0)) E 0
0 0
Plaintiff 19 0 1 3 0 2
Defendant 1 4 2 1 1
The numbers shown in Table 1 are the number of cases where a uni-
versity is either a plaintiff or a defendant. The survey reveals that it is
rare for a university to be sued for patent infringement. Of the twenty
patent infringement cases that came before the Federal Circuit between
1983 and September of 2004, in nineteen cases universities were the
plaintiffs. The only case in which a university was sued for patent in-
fringement was Madey in which the plaintiff was not an industrial entity,
but rather a disgruntled former faculty member.9' Thus, in the 20 patent
infringement cases that were heard by the Federal Circuit in its first
twenty-one years of existence, a university was not once sued by indus-
try for patent infringement. In fact, the only instances where universities
were sued by the biotechnology industry were when corporations sought
declaratory judgments of non-infringement.
Certainly, the survey presented here is only a rough estimation. It
only includes cases that ended up on the Federal Circuit's docket. It
overlooks cases where universities were sued for patent infringement but
never appealed to the Federal Circuit. The survey, however, at least pro-
vides some empirical support for the proposition that universities were
not and are not being threatened by biotechnology industry through pat-
ent infringement suits. An intensive review of the literature on the
subject also reveals no such cases cited.
III. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
EXPERIMENTAL PURPOSE DOCTRINE
As the survey presented in Part II suggested, universities are not be-
ing threatened by patent litigation initiated by corporations. On the
contrary, it is the biotechnology industry that is on the defense. Yet, some
commentators continue to worry that academic research will be inhibited
91. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F3d 1351, 1351-53 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
539 U.S. 958 (2003).
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without a broad interpretation of the experimental purpose doctrine. This
Part provides an economic argument as to why this will not be the case.
One commentator worried that small universities without substantial
resources like the University of California or Johns Hopkins might not
be able to withstand an expensive patent infringement suit. 92 This argu-
ment, however, can be turned around: because of the daunting cost of
patent litigation93 it is very unlikely anyone, including biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies, would sue anyone, including universities, if
there was not a significant commercial value in the patents and infring-
ing activities. Therefore, we can analyze the economic realities of patent
infringement suits brought against universities by looking at the size of
the universities and the commercial value of the infringing activities.
For example, suppose there is a biotechnology company that pat-
ented a highly used research tool and developed a kit based on the
patent. Also assume that although the company markets the kit to re-
search laboratories, everyone who uses the research tool uses it without
obtaining a license or buying the kit.
If the university is large, like the University of California, many labs
will engage in the infringing activities. Consequently, the company
would lose a large amount of royalty income due to the infringing activi-
ties. In such case, if the university's infringing activities are exempted by
experimental purpose doctrine, the patent would lose significant value.
The company would suffer a loss and other companies would lose some
of their incentive to develop new research tools. Therefore the university
should not be exempted. Furthermore, as a large university, the univer-
sity has the resources to defend a patent infringement suit.
Take Integra94 as a real world example. The research at issue was
funded by Merck, one of the world's pharmaceutical giants. If Merck
had not funded Dr. Cheresh's work, it is unlikely that Integra would have
sued Scripps. The lawsuit occurred because Merck not only stood to
profit substantially from the infringing activities, but also because Merck
had the resources to pay a large damage award.
Returning to the hypothetical, if the university is small, there will
only be a few labs infringing the patent. The infringement will be minor,
and the damage award will be small if the patent owner wins an in-
fringement suit. Thus, while a small university may not have enough
resources to defend patent infringement suit, a patent owner does not
92. See Eyel H. Barash, Note, Experimental Uses, Patents, and Scientific Progress, 91
Nw. U. L. REV. 667, 697 (1997).
93. See Megan Barnett, Patents Pending, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 10, 2002, at
33-34 ("Patent lawsuits typically cost each party $1 million, and suits costing $4 million to
$10 million are not unheard of.").
94. 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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have the monetary incentive to go after it. Even if a patent owner really
wanted to make a statement by suing a small university, it likely the par-
ties would settle instead of spending millions of dollars to fight it out in
court.
The above hypothetical demonstrates that if universities, small or
large, infringe a patent, there is no economic reason to exempt such ac-
tivities under the experimental purpose doctrine. It also explains why
patent litigation does not pose a serious threat to academic research.
Companies will hesitate to go after universities for non-economic
reasons as well. For instance, in a jury trial that pits a big pharmaceutical
company against a well respected university, it is doubtful that the phar-
maceutical company will be optimistic about having a sympathetic jury.
Similarly, companies might avoid suing universities for fear of negative
publicity. For example, when the Swiss pharmaceutical company Hoff-
mann-LaRoche initiated a lawsuit against Promega to protect its Taq
polymerase 95 patent, it identified about two hundreds basic researchers
who were allegedly infringing its patent.96 Those researchers, however,
were not charged with infringement. In fact, the company had no interest
in suing them.97
This above analysis is also supported by the survey presented in
Part II.C. Indeed, we have not observed all-out patent infringement suits
against universities. As Professor Eisenberg noted when commenting on
Madey:
As universities shed their noncommercial innocence to reach
deeper into the pockets of commercial firms, one might expect
to see firms strike back with their own infringement claims, urg-
ing courts to reject the experimental use defense as a nostalgic
fantasy.
But this is not what happened. Instead, the experimental use de-
fense was taken out in an inside job, a casualty of an intra-
academic squabble over control resources."
Theoretically research universities could be vulnerable prey of ag-
gressive patent owners, but the reality of patent infringement litigation
renders this worry remote. It is most likely that it will be those research
universities with deep pockets whom the industry-based patent owners
95. The enzyme used in polymerase chain reaction (PCR).
96. Marcia Barinaga, Scientists Named in PCR Suit, 268 SCIENCE 1273 (1995).
97. Id. at 1274; see also Roche-Promega Litigation Still Unsettled, 22 BIOTECHNOLOGY
L. REP. 406 (2003).
98. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1018.
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will go after. And if there is a high stakes patent involved, why should
universities be allowed to infringe without paying the consequences?99
CONCLUSION
Universities should abide by the same rules of patent law as the bio-
technology industry. Universities are major beneficiaries of the Bayh-
Dole Act and have been colleting royalties on their patents from industry.
It is fair to ask universities to reciprocate-to pay royalties to for-profit
biotechnology companies on patents they obtained through their mostly
privately funded endeavors.
While some commentators argue for a broader interpretation of the
experimental purpose doctrine," this approach is not advisable since
granting universities a carte blanche exception will lead to inequity in
patent law; universities and non-profit research organizations could in-
fringe patents, for-profit companies could not. Moreover, to a certain
extent such an exception would be a disguised form of taxing commer-
cial entities to subside private universities. Thus, a broad exception could
be viewed as inconsistent with the policies underlying of patent law.'0 '
The nature of research universities is changing. More than ever uni-
versities are major players in commercializing research breakthroughs.
Giving them advantages in patent infringement suits discriminates
against industrial effort. Large research universities are sophisticated
players in biotechnology industry and frequently are aggressive patent
owners. They have both the resources and the expertise to engage in pat-
ent litigation.
Because litigation costs are very high, a narrow application of ex-
perimental purpose doctrine merely strengthens patent protection. It
forces universities to form research alliances or to bargain with the com-
panies ex ante in order to reach cross-licensing agreements. Therefore, in
reality it will not be a battle between David and Goliath, but an even
match between Goliaths. If, however, research universities begin to
99. If the university is a public school, allowing it to defend its actions based on the
experimental purpose doctrine might even raise constitutional concerns. See generally 5 Chi-
sum, supra note 1 § 16.06 (2004).
100. See Ned A. Israelsen, Making, Using, Selling Without Infringing: An Examination
of 35 U.S.C. Section 271(e) and the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 16
AM. INTELL. PRop. L. Ass'N. Q.J. 457, 475 (1989); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights
and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 218-25 (1987);
Ronald D. Hantman, Experimental Use as an Exception to Patent Infringement, 67 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 617 (1985).
101. See Jordan P Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropri-
ety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169 (1991)(presenting a powerful argument in favor
of narrower interpretation of experimental purpose doctrine).
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suffer under an onslaught of patent infringement suits, Congress can al-
ways step in and legislatively broaden the experimental purpose
doctrine.
In summary, the distinction between academic and commercial enti-
ties, at least in respect to biomedical research, is fading. The equity and
the reality of patent litigation are in favor of a narrow interpretation of
the experimental purpose doctrine. The Federal Circuit decided Madey
and Integra correctly. Madey and Integra made the treatment of patent
infringement by academic and commercial entities uniform and balanced
the interests of the holders and users of patents by strengthening patent
protection.
